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Abstract: Conscription typically involves migration to the duty base location. 
According to DaVanzo’s (1981) theory of repeat migration, this military-motivated 
migration might foster post-military migration. This paper investigates this issue 
empirically using individual-level data drawn from the 1992, 1998, and 2001 editions of 
the French survey of labor market entrants ‘Génération.’ The methods used to identify 
the causal effect of compulsory peacetime conscription on the post-military propensity 
to migrate exploit the abolition of conscription in France in October 1997 plus 
information on the timing of service among those who served. Conscription stimulated 
the post-military propensity to migrate for work of French male labor-market entrants 
with upper-class origins. Furthermore, there is evidence of a previously overlooked 
anticipatory effect of conscription: French males who were waiting to be called up for 
military service were approximately 25% less likely to migrate for work than 
comparable non-conscripts. Some implications of these findings and a consideration of 
their external validity are also provided. 





In his review of internal migration in developed countries, Greenwood (1997) wonders 
whether participation in the military might foster post-military geographical mobility 
(see also Shryock 1964). He argues, for example, that military personnel acquire 
migration experience and knowledge of alternative areas while in service, which might 
encourage a post-service propensity to migrate. Only a few studies have assessed this 
conjecture. Using U.S. census data, Cowper et al. (2000) and Bailey (2011) find higher 
rates of migration among veterans that persist over both the course of life and military 
staffing policies. Using longitudinal microdata, Lee (2012) and Doetsch (2012) contrast 
the geographical mobility of U.S. veterans and nonveterans in the aftermath of the 
American Civil War and World War I, respectively. They find that wartime military 
service has positive, or at least nonnegative, effects on post-war geographical mobility. 
Prior to this, Corvisier (1971) and Baker (1998) gathered quantitative evidence on how 
the French military promoted geographical mobility, in periods when the French army 
was composed mainly of professional soldiers or was frequently involved in military 
conflicts. 
However, it appears that no one has studied the effect that compulsory peacetime 
conscription may exert on subsequent geographical mobility. Military service may 
involve migration to the duty base location, so conscripts may also acquire migration 
experience and knowledge of alternative areas of the country while in service. In the 
terminology of Eldridge (1965) and DaVanzo (1983), this ‘primary migration’ could 
then foster ‘repeat migration.’ Perhaps in the same vein, moving away from domicile 
for higher education is positively related to subsequent migration for work (Faggian, 
McCann, and Sheppard 2007). 
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Previous research has shown that the socio-economic effects of military service 
vary with the type of service (MacLean and Elder 2007). Indeed, a number of reasons 
suggest that migration patterns among veterans documented by previous research might 
not extrapolate to former peacetime conscripts. Prominent among these reasons is 
health: The incidence of wounds and diseases in the population of U.S. veterans, which 
is composed overwhelmingly of war veterans, is much higher than among former 
peacetime conscripts, and there is evidence that poor health strongly diminishes 
geographical mobility (Lee 2008). An alternative pathway by which military 
participation affects U.S. veterans’ mobility is through difficulties in readjustment to 
civilian life after war in the form of joblessness or ostracism (Lee 2008), but these 
difficulties seem less likely to pose a problem for peacetime conscripts. Additionally, 
the migration experience and knowledge of alternative areas acquired by peacetime 
conscripts might differ from those gained by wartime conscripts and professional 
soldiers.1 
Overall, therefore, the effect exerted by compulsory peacetime conscription on 
the subsequent propensity to migrate within a country is not easily predictable. 
However, it is important to measure it. Many countries around the world require young 
people to spend time in the armed forces, including Lithuania, Sweden, and Ukraine, 
which have recently reintroduced the draft, and Norway, which expanded conscription 
in 2015 to include female citizens (Bieri 2015). In France, one-month compulsory 
national service for people aged 16 is expected to be launched in 2022. The internal 
                                                            
1 Lee (2012) highlights the importance of distance traveled while in service as a 
predictor of geographical mobility, so without the opportunity for traveling to distant 
places, military service during the American Civil War would indeed have decreased 
veterans’ geographical mobility. 
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migration of young workers is a major mechanism for geographically redistributing 
labor resources in response to changing economic and demographic conditions, and thus 
helps to raise an economy’s total output through a more efficient allocation of resources, 
to boost the speed at which workers and firms adjust to localized shocks, to reduce an 
area’s equilibrium level of unemployment, and to speed up the process of income 
convergence across regions (Blanchard and Katz 1992; Saks and Wozniak 2011; Ozgen, 
Nijkamp, and Poot 2010). 
In the next section, I argue for a causal effect of conscription on subsequent 
geographical mobility using DaVanzo’s (1981) repeat migration theory. I then 
investigate this issue empirically using several treatment assessment methods applied to 
individual-level data drawn from the 1992, 1998, and 2001 editions of the French 
survey of labor market entrants ‘Génération’ (Generation). I first provide background 
on French military service and review the data and the construction of the samples, then 
explain the measures of conscription status and internal migration. Previous studies 
contrasting migration patterns of veterans and nonveterans have not focused on 
migration for work due to lack of data. Generation enables me to do this. 
The methods used in this paper to identify the causal effect of compulsory 
peacetime conscription on the post-military propensity to migrate exploit the abolition 
of conscription in France in October 1997. I find evidence that military service 
positively influenced subsequent decisions to migrate for work within France among 
individuals with upper-class origins. Moreover, making use of information on the 
timing of service among those who served, I find that conscription reduced the 
migration-for-work propensity of French males who were waiting to be called up. Some 




This paper contributes to two main strands of work. First, it adds to previous 
work on the labor market effects of compulsory peacetime conscription. This literature 
emphasizes subsequent effects on employment, earnings, and occupation (see e.g. 
Imbens and van der Klaauw 1995; Maurin and Xenogiani 2007; Granier, Joseph, and 
Joutard 2011; Grenet, Hart, and Roberts 2011; Bauer et al. 2012; Card and Cardoso 
2012; Hubers and Webbink 2015; Grönqvist and Lindqvist 2016; Torun and Tumen 
2016; Albaek et al. 2017). A notable exception is Torun (2016), who finds that the 
expected interruption of civilian life created by military service reduces the labor force 
participation and employment of male teenagers who are waiting to be called up. 
Second, a body of research suggests that the extent of previous migration is closely 
correlated with subsequent migration behavior (see e.g. Eldridge 1965; Morrison 1971; 
Vanderkamp 1971; DaVanzo 1981, 1983; Newbold and Bell 2001; Faggian, McCann, 
and Sheppard 2007). Apparently, however, no one has previously investigated the 
impact of peacetime conscription on subsequent migration. 
Conceptual Framework 
Shields and Shields (1989) organize the theoretical literature on internal migration 
around four different approaches in which the potential migrant is viewed, in turn, as a 
supplier of labor, an investor in human capital, a consumer of locational amenities, and 
a producer of household commodities. Common to all four approaches, though, is the 
existence of uncertainty regarding living conditions and employment opportunities in 
the possible destinations, and of economic and non-economic costs associated with 
migration. Although potential migrants can engage in information-gathering to reduce 
uncertainty, this, like migration itself, is costly. As to migration costs, they stem largely 
from replacing or transferring elsewhere location-specific capital, i.e. ‘concrete and 
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intangible assets such as job seniority or close friendships whose value would be lost, 
costly to replace, or steadily diminished if one lived somewhere else.’ (DaVanzo 1983) 
Information costs and location-specific capital are central to DaVanzo’s (1981) 
analytical framework for repeat migration. That framework suggests several reasons 
why migration from the domicile to the location of the duty base could foster post-
military migration. First, conscripts may become more adept at collecting and 
processing migration-relevant information, in a learning-by-doing effect. Second, as 
also suggested by Lee (2008), conscripts may have the opportunity to collect, either 
firsthand or from peer conscripts, information about other places in the country at little 
or no cost. Third, as the amount of location-specific capital is likely to be positively 
correlated with the length of stay in a place, conscripts may have built up less location-
specific capital in their place of origin. And fourth, conscripts may retain some location-
specific capital in the place of deployment, so that they may be less reluctant to move 
there after service. 
At the empirical level, a simple comparison of former conscripts’ and non-
conscripts’ migration outcomes is unlikely to be informative about the causal effect of 
conscription on post-service geographical mobility, as certain types of men are more 
likely to serve than others (Angrist 1990; Imbens and van der Klaauw 1995). For one 
thing, these groups may differ in terms of unobserved characteristics likely to be 
correlated with their ability to acquire and process information and/or to replace and 
transfer location-specific capital. Conscripts, for example, are generally positively 
selected in terms of health and cognitive ability, and acquiring and processing 
information and/or replacing or transferring location-specific capital may be easier for 
healthier or cognitively abler individuals. Perhaps in this vein, Corvisier (1971) found 
that French soldiers serving in overseas territories came from more mobile families than 
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soldiers serving in metropolitan France. Second, as argued by DaVanzo (1981), certain 
people might be intrinsically more migration-prone, and since military service may 
involve moving away from one’s place of residence, the most migration-prone could be 
less reluctant to serve. For these reasons, mere comparisons of former conscripts’ and 
non-conscripts’ migration outcomes will probably show higher mobility for the former 
due to a positive selection bias effect. 
Background, Data, and Sample 
French National Service 
All young French men were subject to so-called ‘national service’ (NS) at the age of 18, 
although they had the right to defer their service until the age of 22 with no specific 
justification (from 1970 onwards, women could also serve on a voluntary enrollment 
basis). Despite its obligatory nature, about a third of men born before 1975 avoided 
national service (Fize and Louis-Sidois 2018). The main reasons for exemption were 
medical conditions as assessed by military doctors and being the breadwinner of a 
family. 
French national service was of two basic types. The standard type consisted of a 
ten-month period of military service (12 months up to 1992). The nonstandard type, 
which could last more than 10 months, could be served in the police, the fire service, as 
a technical assistant in an overseas territory, as an aid worker in a foreign country, or as 
a conscientious objector. In 1992, 94% of conscripts did the standard service (FMD 
1993), as meeting the needs of the army took priority in the distribution of conscripts. 
Staying on in education was one way to avoid immediate national service and to 




In times of peace, conscripts could serve ‘in any part of France or even Europe’ 
(NS Code, articles L. 70 and L. 94-3). From 1987 onwards, the French Ministry of 
Defense attempted to assign conscripts to military bases located in their region of 
residence, although a shift of human resources to the east was unavoidable because of 
the different centers of gravity of the population and of military units (FMD 1994). 
Ribouillault (1998, 58) states that about a third of conscripts had to travel far from their 
domiciles (to the east, or to ports or arsenals) to reach their duty bases. According to an 
official report, the average railway distance between the domicile and the duty base was 
435 km (Chauveau 1990). 
The difficulties encountered by the French army during the 1991 Gulf War 
convinced President Jacques Chirac of the necessity to rethink the French military. On 
22 February 1996, he announced the intention to fully professionalize the armed forces 
by 2002. The transition to an all-volunteer force was made progressively. During the 
professionalization process, the 1997 reform of national service officially exempted 
men born after 1978 from service in October 1997. Men born before 1 January 1979 
were still obliged to serve for ten months. But the fact that the reform introduced (or 
extended) deferments linked to work (education), and that the military administration 
stopped using conscripts in August 2001, led to a gradual decrease in the proportion 
conscripted for cohorts born after 1974 (Fize and Louis-Sidois 2018). 
Data and Sample 
The primary data source for this research is the Generation survey, run by the French 
Center for Research on Education, Training, and Employment (Céreq). Generation is a 
retrospective telephone survey of individuals who, in a certain year, left the education 
system for at least one year for the first time, conducted a few years after leaving 
education. Generation seeks to faithfully reconstruct month by month these individuals’ 
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activity status so as to characterize their entry into the labor market. It also includes 
information on birth date, educational attainment level, place of residence (at the start of 
secondary education and at the end of studies), and workplace location for each job held 
during the survey period (‘survey period’ means the period between leaving education 
and being interviewed for Generation). Unfortunately, Generation did not ask for 
geographical information for the spell of national service. 
I use the Generation surveys for 1992, 1998, and 2001 (Céreq 1997, 2001, 2004) 
obtained from the French Data Archives for Social Sciences (Réseau Quetelet). 
Individuals leaving education in 1992 (respectively 2001) were interviewed in 1997 
(2004). Those leaving in 1998 were interviewed on four occasions: 2001, 2003, 2005, 
and 2008. I use the sample of 1998 leavers interviewed in 2001 because of its much 
larger size. For more information on Generation, see 
http://www.cereq.fr/index.php/themes/Acces-aux-donnees-Themes/Enquetes-d-
insertion-Generation. 
I use a variety of samples for the different analyses conducted. To be included in 
any of these samples, individuals must reach the age of 16‒23 in the year in which they 
leave education and must meet the following conditions (Table A1 in the Appendix 
details their impact on the number of observations). First, demographic data must be 
non-missing. Second, the place of residence at the start of secondary education and at 
the end of studies must be in France (including overseas territories). Third, individuals 
must have at least one job during the survey period. Fourth, the location of the entry job 
(defined below) must be known and in France. Fifth, for individuals who worked before 
doing national service, job location(s) must be known and in France. And sixth, for the 
reasons given below, the place of residence on leaving education and the location of the 
entry job may not both be in overseas territories. 
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Maurin and Xenogiani (2007) use data from the French Labor Force Survey to 
show that military service was providing male students with incentives to pursue 
education after the age of 16, and that those incentives disappeared after the 1997 
reform. I find evidence consistent with draft avoidance behavior (Card and Lemieux 
2001; Bauer et al. 2014; Mouganie 2015; Torun and Tumen 2016) in a sample of 
individuals born between 1973 and 1982 constructed from the three editions of 
Generation. Table A2 shows the results of regressing three measures of educational 
attainment on complete sets of year-of-birth and gender dummies, plus an interaction of 
the male dummy with a dummy for being born after 1978. The three measures indicate a 
significant decline in relative educational attainment for men exempted from service. 
One possible implication of draft avoidance behavior is that certain age classes 
of male education leavers might be selected on migration proneness. Consider males 
leaving education in 1998. Those aged 16‒19 (and therefore born after 1978) would 
have had no incentives to delay military service by continuing their education. By 
contrast, some of those aged 20‒23 would have left education at an older age in order to 
delay their service. If one of the incentives for staying on in education is the risk of 
being deployed outside one’s place of residence at a younger age, those aged 20‒23 
would, on average, be less migration-prone than the 16‒19-year-old class. Some results 
of this research make sense in light of this reasoning. 
Measures 
I infer conscription status from the reported monthly activity status (only one status can 
be reported for any one month). Individuals who report a spell of national service during 
the survey period are classified as conscripts; otherwise they are classified as non-
conscripts. The type of service cannot be distinguished generally in the data, but 
nonstandard service could also mean being deployed outside one’s place of residence, 
12 
 
so it may also have promoted subsequent internal migration. In the samples given in the 
last row of Table A1, 71% (23%) of the men surveyed in Generation 1992 (1998) are 
classified as conscripts. Among women, the proportion who volunteered was 0.5% 
(0.4%). There are no conscripts in Generation 2001 because the French military 
administration stopped using conscripts in August 2001. 
A limitation of Generation is that individuals could have done their national 
service before leaving the education system. Such individuals are misclassified in the 
data as non-conscripts. Let S  be the unobserved true indicator for having done the 
service, and let S  be its observed error-ridden counterpart. Assume that 
 prob 1 0 0S S    . Granier, Joseph, and Joutard (2011) report that 
 prob 0 1 0.02S S     in Generation 1992 and  prob 0 1 0.125S S     in 
Generation 1998. By the total probability theorem     
prob 1
prob 1









, which can be calculated using the estimates of  prob 1S   given above. Thus, 
expression (5) in Lewbel (2007) suggests that misclassification may attenuate the 
estimated effects of conscription by just about 5%. 
Information on place of residence and work is provided at the level of 
commuting zones (zones d'emploi) constructed by the French Statistical Office (INSEE) 
using journey-to-work data from the 1990 Census.2 This geography appears to be 
particularly appropriate for studying internal labor migration. First, operationalizing 
migration as a move between local labor markets matches the notion of migration used 
                                                            
2 In Generation 1992, the geographic information is provided at the level of 
municipalities (communes). I allocate municipalities to commuting zones using a 
crosswalk created by INSEE: https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/2114596. 
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in most economic models of internal labor migration. Second, bounding migration by 
commuting patterns improves on the arbitrary nature of some alternative measures of 
migration (e.g. those based on cross-boundary movement: Yankow 2002; Tolbert, 
Blanchard, and Irwin 2009). And third, the exhaustive partition of metropolitan France 
into 348 commuting zones that remained unaltered until 2010 removes concerns about 
identifying migrations consistently in different editions of Generation.3 
I call a migration between the commuting zone of residence at the end of studies 
and the zone where the entry job (defined below) is located an entry move. Looking at 
entry moves assesses the causal effect of conscription when it is expected to be clearest 
(i.e. right after completing the national service). More specifically, I analyze onward 
entry moves, defined as entry moves whose destination is other than the zone of 
residence at the start of secondary education. 93% of all entry moves observed in the 
whole sample are onward moves. The indicator for moving onward is M . 
For non-conscripts, the entry job is the first job held during the survey period. 
For conscripts, though, there are two possibilities: The first is to equate the entry job to 
the first job held after completing the national service. The resulting migration indicator 
is 1M . In this case, the entry job coincides with the first job held during the survey 
period for those who did the service and then worked (47% of conscripts), but not for 
those who worked, did their service, then worked again (51%). (The remaining 2% who 
worked, did the service, and then did not work again are excluded from analyses of 1M
.) This raises the issue that migration-for-work experience accumulated before doing 
national service might foster subsequent geographical mobility. I can calculate the 
                                                            
3 Overseas territories were not zoned until 2007, so it cannot be ascertained whether 
individuals changed zone within overseas territories. This is the reason for the sixth 
selection criterion listed above. 
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number of zones where jobs were located, but this variable is correlated with S  and, 
therefore, endogenous. 
The second possibility, which yields migration indicator 2M , is to equate the 
entry job to the first job held during the survey period. The causal effect of conscription 
is thus implicitly evaluated depending on having served before working, as migration-
for-work decisions by individuals who worked before national service cannot be 
influenced by the service itself. Focusing on individuals who served before working 
may introduce further biases into the analysis, but 2M  is useful in using the timing of 
service to assess the causal effect of conscription. 
Descriptive statistics for the main variables are presented in Table A3 jointly 
with some definitions. Migration rates range from 0.28 to 0.35. These rates are 
somewhat higher than the 27% estimate developed by Margirier (2006) for individuals 
of any age drawn from Generation 1998. The higher migration rates are observed in the 
latter editions of Generation, which is consistent with the increasing mobility of French 
young adults documented by Baccaïni (2007). Educational attainment is measured on 
five levels. During the period of observation, education in France was influenced by a 
person’s social origins and a very powerful determinant of the level at which he/she 
entered the workforce (Goux and Maurin 1997). 
Identification Strategies 
Difference-in-Differences (DID) 
The DID strategy relies on the classification of young men into two groups according to 
the binary variable Z, whose values are set with reference to the 1997 reform of French 
national service and are therefore considered to be as good as randomly assigned. 
Differences in migration outcomes can be driven by aggregate factors unrelated to the 
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reform, so women classified according to Z are included in the estimations as a control 
group. 
The sample analyzed is drawn from the three editions of Generation. 1Z   for 
individuals born in 1978 or earlier and 0Z   for individuals born after 1978. In the 
case of males, 1Z   indicates males who were eligible for service and 0Z   males 
exempted from service (i.e. non-eligible). 54% of males with 1Z   served (i.e. were 
treated), whereas less than 1% of males with 0Z   did so. The coefficient on the 
interaction term between the male dummy and Z  gives the causal effect of conscription 
eligibility. This effect divided by the difference in compliance rates between eligible 
and non-eligible men approximates the average causal effect of conscription on those 
who served (Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
The key identifying assumption of the DID strategy is that migration trends for 
men and women would have been the same in the absence of the reform. Figure 1 
shows internal labor migration rates by birth year separately for men and women plus 
differences in these rates. Migration rates for men are generally slightly higher. Prior to 
1979, the trends look fairly parallel. The differences after 1978 look roughly similar to 
the differences in previous years, so visually there appears to be little evidence that the 
abolition of conscription decreased migration among men. This conclusion, however, 
might be affected by compositional effects.4 
Regression Discontinuity (RD) 
                                                            
4 The jump observed between 1974 and 1975 is due in part to the composition of the 
sample. Individuals born in 1974 are drawn from Generation 1992 and are therefore 18 
years old. Individuals born in 1975 are drawn from both Generation 1992 (17 years old) 
and Generation 1998 (23 years old), so on average they are older and more educated 
than those born in 1974. 
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Grenet, Hart, and Roberts (2011) and Bauer et al. (2012) use the RD design of the 
military draft in Great Britain and Germany, respectively, to estimate the effect of 
military service on conscripts’ subsequent labor market outcomes. In the same vein, the 
abolition of compulsory conscription in France represents a quasi-experiment to which 
male teenagers (but not males in their twenties) leaving the education system in 1998 
were exposed. Figure 2 shows that the proportion of men who did national service by 
birth year (calculated from Generation 1998) dropped significantly at the threshold date, 
whereas the propensity to migrate (represented by 1M  and net of a linear trend in birth 
year) changed little. Visually, therefore, there appears to be little evidence that the 
abolition of conscription in France reduced migration among men. But, again, this 
conclusion might be affected by compositional effects. 
To estimate the RD effect of conscription, let  ix c  denote individual si  birth 
year centered at 1979c  . The following model is fitted on the sample of men drawn 
from Generation 1998: 
 1i i i i iM S X W u         , (1) 
where iX  is a vector of polynomial terms in  ix c , iW  is a vector of individual-level 
controls, and iu  is an error term. The treatment group is males born before 1979 
 ix c  and therefore not exempted from service, and the control group is males born 
after 1978  ix c  and therefore exempted from service. Allocation to treatment and 
control groups is a deterministic function of the birth date, but doing national service is 
not, because not all men born before 1979 served. Hence, equation (1) is estimated by 
the instrumental variables (IV) method using  1 ix c  as an instrument for iS ,  1   
being the usual indicator function (Lee and Card 2008). 
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A major concern with this approach is that men close to the threshold date on 
each side may not be comparable in unobservables that affect 1M . Among men who left 
education in 1998, those in the treatment group are older and generally more educated, 
and some of them may have stayed on in education in order to delay their service, so 
they might be intrinsically less migration prone than men in the control group. In that 
case, potential migration outcomes and  1 ix c  would be negatively correlated, which 
would tend to bias both the reduced-form effect of  1 ix c  on 1iM  and ̂  in the 
negative direction.5 
Timing of Service 
Inspired by Lee’s (2012) strategy for disentangling treatment and selection effects, I 
utilize the timing of service among those who served to tackle the selectivity issue. For 
conscripts who worked before doing their service, entry moves as represented by 2M  
cannot be influenced by the service itself. However, these individuals were non-
randomly selected into the army, so comparing their migration decisions to those of 
non-conscripts should provide information on the selection effect. Furthermore, under 
the assumption that the decision as to whether to do their service before or after working 
is uncorrelated with unobservables related to mobility, differences in the propensity to 
migrate between conscripts who served before working and conscripts who served after 
working may reveal the causal effect of conscription on post-service migration. 
Results 
                                                            
5 This argument is different from that used by Granier, Joseph, and Joutard (2011) to 
discard the RD strategy. They argue that the discontinuity in the proportion of men who 
served was created by men who did their service at a time when it was easier to avoid it, 
which questions the validity of the proportion who served as an instrument for S . 
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I start this section by showing the results of OLS comparisons of migration outcomes by 
conscription status, then go on to report estimates derived from the estimation strategies 
presented above. Finally, I discuss some implications of the main findings and consider 
their external validity. Except when noted, regressions contain a complete set of 
dummies for commuting zone of residence at the end of studies plus the following 
personal determinants of onward migration (Schlottmann and Herzog 1981; DaVanzo 
1983; Faggian, McCann, and Sheppard 2007; Newbold and Cicchino 2007): Age 
reached in the year of leaving education, dummies for educational attainment, and a 
dummy indicating a change of zone between the start of secondary education and the 
end of studies. The vector with these individual-level covariates is denoted by W . 
OLS Estimates 
A simple OLS regression of 1M  on S , W , and a complete set of year-of-birth dummies 
yields the results reported in Table 1. In the sample of men drawn from Generation 
1992, conscripts are 3.0 (S.E. 0.9) percentage points (ppt) more likely to migrate at the 
entry job stage than non-conscripts. The estimated effect in the sample of men drawn 
from Generation 1998 is substantially larger: 6.1 (S.E. 1.0) ppt, which amounts to 17% 
of average migration in the 1998 sample. The estimate obtained in the sample drawn 
from the three editions of Generation suggests that conscripts are 4.7 (S.E. 0.7) ppt more 
mobile. The corresponding average marginal effects (AMEs) yielded by probit 
regressions are almost identical. These estimates do not account for selective 
recruitment by the army or for the possibility that migration-prone individuals could be 
less reluctant to serve. This latter reason may be behind the larger coefficient estimated 
in the 1998 sample, as after the announcement of the abolition of military service it 
became easier to avoid it, and those who then served had to be less reluctant to do so. 
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As to personal determinants of onward migration, the likelihood of migration 
increases by 0.6 (S.E. 0.3) ppt as men age. As expected, the higher the education level 
attained, the greater the propensity to migrate. In column (3), for example, men with a 
bachelor’s degree are 32.7 (S.E. 1.7) ppt more likely to migrate than men without a 
CAP/BEP diploma, which represents a 96% increase in the average propensity to 
migrate in the whole sample of men (0.339). Having migrated during their studies 
increases the degree of mobility, especially in the oldest sample, where with all else 
being equal prior migrants are 7.8 (S.E. 1.5) ppt more likely to migrate. 
DID Estimates 
Tables 2 and 3 present the main results yielded by the DID strategy. Table 2 shows 
coefficients from regressions containing all individuals, while Table 3 shows results 
obtained by using subsamples of the data. In column (1) of Table 2, 1M  is regressed on 
*Male Z , W , and complete sets of year-of-birth and gender dummies. The size of the 
coefficient estimate on *Male Z  is 0.015 (S.E. 0.008) and it is statistically different 
from zero at around the 5% significance level. This suggests that men born before 1979 
are 1.5 ppt more likely to migrate at the entry job stage than comparable men born later. 
This effect divided by the difference in compliance rates between the two groups (0.53) 
approximates the causal effect of conscription on men who served: 2.8 ppt, which 
amounts to 8% of the average propensity to migrate at the entry job stage. The size of 
the effect changes little when a linear trend interacted with the male dummy is added to 
the specification (column 2), or when probit regressions are run and the AME of 
*Male Z  is calculated following Ai and Norton (2003).6 
                                                            
6 I also checked whether the probability of working abroad (and, thus, of being excluded 
from sample) differs between eligible and non-eligible men. Ceteris paribus, eligible 
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Migration propensities tend to rise with education, and since military service 
induced individuals to remain in education, it might have fostered migration for reasons 
unrelated to repeat migration. To assess the size of the total effect (direct and indirect) 
of conscription, I re-estimate the models dropping the personal determinants. Results 
are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. The equality of the coefficient on 
*Male Z  in the models including and excluding personal determinants is rejected (p-
values < 0.05),7 but the total effect is larger under common trends only. 
The ability to migrate provided by military service might be greater for groups 
on whom the military service could have a greater impact. Hence, I re-estimate the 
models with observations classified according to the father’s last socio-occupational 
category8 and to the type of municipality (rural/urban) at the end of studies. Results are 
presented in Table 3. The data reveals no significant shift in the relative propensity to 
migrate of men with lower-class origins, but men from upper-class families born before 
1979 are about 4 ppt more likely to migrate than comparable men born later. This effect 
divided by the difference in compliance rates between the two groups of upper-class 
men (.53) yields a causal effect of conscription on male conscripts from upper-class 
families of about 7.5 ppt, or 20% of the average propensity to migrate of upper-class 
men (0.379). As to the rural/urban split, equality of conscription eligibility effects 
                                                                                                                                                                              
men are more likely to work abroad, but the difference is small, especially after 
accounting for a linear trend for men. 
7 Cross-model tests were conducted with the help of Stata command suest. 
8 This characteristic is missing for 9% of observations. As in Goux and Maurin (1997), 
children of farmers, routine non-manual employees, and manual skilled and non-skilled 
workers form the lower class; children of employers, managerial employees, and 
technicians, supervisors, and other lower-grade professionals form the upper class. 
21 
 
cannot be rejected whether or not common trends are assumed (p-values > 0.53). Since 
both urban and rural residents show similar differences in compliance rates between 
eligible and non-eligible men, the causal effect of conscription on rural/urban men who 
serve seems to be about the same. 
RD Estimates 
Table 4 presents the main results for the RD approach. The personal determinants now 
exclude age as its effect is captured by  ix c . In column (1), iX  consists of  ix c ; 
column (2) adds  2ix c ; columns (3) and (4) allow for extra flexibility by adding the 
interaction between  1 ix c  and iX  to the controls used in columns (1) and (2), 
respectively. The first entry in each column gives the reduced-form effect of  1 ix c  
on 1iM , the second entry is the first-stage effect of  1 ix c  on iS , and the third entry 
gives ̂ . Following Kolesár and Rothe (2018), the standard error for ̂  is the usual 
heteroskedasticity-robust IV standard error. 
In column (1), men born before 1979 migrate less, on average, than men born 
later. The difference of 2.9 (S.E. 1.3) ppt attains statistical significance at 5%. Men born 
before 1979 are also 13.7 (S.E. 1.1) ppt more likely to be conscripts. The estimate for   
suggests that conscripts are 20.9 (S.E. 9.9) ppt less likely to move than non-conscripts. 
The negative sign of the reduced-form coefficient and of ̂  seems to result from the 
caveat pointed out when discussing the RD strategy. Results remain essentially 
unchanged when a quadratic term in  ix c  or the interaction between  1 ix c  and 
 ix c  is added to the specification. In column (4), the estimated first-stage effect of 
 1 ix c  on iS  is almost zero and the resulting ̂  is much more imprecisely measured. 
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I re-estimate model (1) using the bivariate probit method (see e.g. Wooldridge 
2010) allowing iS  to be endogenous and including  1 ix c  in the probit for iS . (Due 
to computational difficulties, dummies for commuting zones are replaced by dummies 
for province of residence at the end of studies.) Table 5 presents the main estimated 
AMEs plus the estimated correlation for the error terms in the probits for 1iM  and iS  
(denoted by ̂ ). The correlation between unobservables that affect 1iM  and iS  seems 
small. The estimated AME of  1 ix c  on iS  is now larger, whereas the estimated 
AME of iS  on 1iM , which is positive in some specifications, is still measured very 
imprecisely. Overall, the results from this more sophisticated RD analysis do not 
improve on the visual evidence presented in Figure 2. 
Timing-of-Service Estimates 
Table 6 shows the main results of regressing 2M  on S , an indicator for having done 
national service before working (denoted by T ), W , and a complete set of year-of-birth 
dummies. The coefficient estimated on S  gives the counterfactual difference in 
migration rates between conscripts and non-conscripts if all conscripts had worked 
before doing national service, so that migration could not be influenced by the service 
itself. This effect plus the coefficient on T  gives the total mobility advantage of a 
conscript over a non-conscript at the entry job stage. 
In the sample of men drawn from Generation 1992, the estimated coefficient on 
S  appears to be negative and statistically different from zero (column 1), suggesting 
that conscripts who worked before doing their service are 5.2 (S.E. 1.0) ppt less likely to 
migrate than non-conscripts. A similar result is obtained in comparable samples drawn 
from Generation 1998 (column 2) and from the three editions of Generation (column 3). 
This result is also robust to estimation by probit. 
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This unexpectedly negative coefficient on S  is probably the consequence of a 
previously overlooked anticipatory effect of compulsory conscription. Torun (2016) 
finds that the expected interruption in civilian life created by military service reduces 
labor force participation and employment among male teenagers who are waiting to be 
called up (see also Oi 1967). Additionally, I find evidence that migration for work is 
less prevalent among young male labor market entrants who are waiting to be called up. 
The standard human capital model provides a simple explanation for this (see e.g. 
Borjas 2015). 76% of those who did national service and were employed before that had 
to change employers on their return, so potential conscripts have a shorter period over 
which they can collect the returns on migration, which decreases net gains from 
migration and, hence, lowers the probability of migration. 
The existence of an anticipatory effect of conscription precludes estimating its 
causal effect on post-service migration from the estimated coefficients reported in each 
column of Table 6. Let s   0s  , a   0a  , and c   0c   denote the selection, 
anticipatory, and causal effects associated with conscription, respectively. The 
coefficient on S  gives s a  . The anticipatory effect is absent in the case of those 
who did their service before working, so the sum of the coefficients on S  and T  is 
s c  , so the coefficient on T  gives c a  . 
But if, as the evidence presented above suggests, the average size of the causal 
effect on subsequent migration is 0.028, then the result of subtracting this quantity from 
the estimated coefficient on T  would approximate the absolute value of the negative 
anticipatory labor migration response to conscription. Thus, in the sample drawn from 
all three editions of Generation (column 3 of Table 6), the size of the anticipatory effect 
would be 9.5 ppt, which amounts to over a quarter of the average propensity to migrate 
at the entry job stage. 
24 
 
This size, however, might be somewhat inflated. Because of the deferments 
linked to working introduced by the 1997 reform, men who left education in 1998 and 
worked before doing their national service might be less migration prone than 
comparable men who served before working. Suppose that the selection effect is s  for 
the former group and s  for the latter, with 0s s   . Then, in the sample drawn 
from Generation 1998 the coefficient on T  would give  c a s s      , and the sum 
of the coefficients on S  and T  would be s c  . This sum would be larger than the 
coefficient on S  in column (2) of Table 1, which is about 
2
s s
c    . Indeed, the 3.3 
ppt difference between the sum of the estimated coefficients on S  and T  reported in 
column (2) of Table 6 and the corresponding estimated coefficient on S  listed in Table 
1 is statistically significant (p-value 0.00). The same calculation on the sample drawn 
from Generation 1992 yields a statistically insignificant difference of 1.0 ppt (p-value 
0.15). In the sample from all three editions of Generation, the 1.4 ppt difference is 
statistically significant (p-value 0.00). 
Table 7 presents the results of splitting the data according to the father’s last 
socio-occupational category and whether the municipality is rural or urban. If, as the 
evidence presented above suggests, the causal effect on subsequent migration for men 
from lower-class (upper-class) families is zero (0.075), then the anticipatory response 
will be larger for the former: 11.3 vs. 6.9 ppt. Formally, the hypothesis of equality of 
anticipatory effects by class location is rejected (p-value 0.01). As to the rural/urban 
split, if the causal effect on subsequent migration is assumed to be the same for both 
groups, then the size of the anticipatory effect will be larger for individuals from urban 
municipalities: The null of equality of coefficients on T  by type of municipality is 




Overall, the evidence presented here suggests that compulsory peacetime conscription 
has an effect on subsequent internal labor migration which stems from the behavior of 
individuals from upper-class families, for whom military service significantly increases 
the post-service propensity to migrate for work. This finding has implications in light of 
DaVanzo’s repeat migration hypothesis. It suggests, for example, that the improvement 
in collecting and processing migration-relevant information provided by military 
service, plus the acquisition of knowledge of and the formation of friendships at the 
place of destination are significant for individuals from upper-class families, but not for 
individuals with lower-class origins. However, without information on the experiences 
of conscripts while in service it is not possible to ascertain the specific pathways by 
which conscription produces these heterogeneous responses by class location. 
According to the evidence that compulsory military service reduces the 
propensity to migrate for work among young men who are waiting to be called up, 
conscription seems to be acting as a barrier to migration (Klaassen and Drewe 1973), 
reducing the mobility of labor market entrants who would otherwise have moved to find 
more productive opportunities. This barrier appears to be stronger for individuals from 
lower-class families and from urban municipalities, who are the least mobile groups of 
the population. 
There remains the issue of the external validity of these findings. During the 
period considered, French conscripts had to serve for 10 months and attempts were 
made to assign them to military bases in their region of residence. A longer period of 
service may stimulate the formation of location-specific capital at the place of 
destination, while a greater distance between the domicile and the duty base may reduce 
the number of trips home and, thus, the amount of location-specific capital built up at 
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the place of residence. Other considerations are whether conscripts change duty bases 
during military service and how far they travel while in service. For all these reasons, 
the post-service impact of compulsory conscription on internal labor migration in 
France may not be perfectly externally valid. The negative anticipatory effect on labor 
migration would presumably not work in countries where the law requires employers to 
continue any pre-existing contracts after military service. 
Conclusion 
I have used the abolition of compulsory conscription in France in 1997 and information 
on the timing of service among those who served to test whether compulsory peacetime 
conscription fosters a propensity to migrate at the entry job stage. My most reliable 
evidence suggests that conscription stimulates the post-service propensity to migrate of 
male labor market entrants with upper-class origins. Furthermore, conscription reduces 
the propensity to migrate for work among young men waiting to be called up by 
approximately a quarter. However, these results may not be perfectly externally valid. 
Longer periods of service at a duty base further away might intensify the association 
between conscription and subsequent migration, whereas the negative anticipatory 
effect on labor migration may not work in countries where the law requires employers 
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Table A1. Sample selection criteria. 
 Generation 1992 Generation 1998 Generation 2001 
No. of individuals reaching the age of 
16‒23 in the year in which they leave 
education 
22,721 41,389 8,781 
After deletion for missing demographic 
data 
22,426 40,950 8,708 
After deletion for not living in France 
at the start of secondary education or at 
the end of studies 
22,330 40,650 8,708 
After deletion for not having at least 
one job during the survey period 
21,716 38,577 8,449 
After deletion for not having the entry 
job in a known place of Francea 
21,190 32,813 7,159 
After deletion for working before doing 
national service and not having job 
location(s) in known places of France 
21,061 31,893 7,159 
After deletion for having the place of 
residence on leaving education and the 
location of the entry job in overseas 
territories. 
21,059 (11,577) 31,893 (17,308) 7,159 (3,401) 






Table A2. The effect of the 1997 reform on three educational outcomes. 




Years of completed 
education 
Male*(1973‒78) Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Male*(1979‒82) -.27 (.03) -.050 (.009) -.13 (.04) 
Year-of-birth and 
gender dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared .57 .36 .39 
Observations 46,651 46,651 46,651 
Notes: OLS estimates. Sample drawn from Generation 1992, 1998, and 2001,
containing individuals born in 1973‒82 reaching the age of 16‒23 in the year in
which they leave education. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses. a: The individual passed the baccalauréat, which is the general






Table A3. Descriptive statistics. 
 Generation 1992 Generation 1998  Generation 2001 
 Men All Men All  Men All 
Migrated at the entry job stage  1M  0.317 0.306 0.354 0.348  0.338 0.339 
Migrated at the entry job stage  2M  0.282 0.287 0.342 0.341  0.338 0.339 
Conscript  1S   0.712 0.394 0.228 0.126  0 0 
National service before workinga 0.432 0.432 0.542 0.540    
Age (in years) 20.0 (1.7) 20.0 (1.7) 20.1 (1.8) 20.3 (1.8)  20.4 (1.8) 20.8 (1.7)
Born before 1979 1 1 0.591 0.652  0.176 0.214 
Bachelor diplomab 0.058 0.075 0.065 0.094  0.119 0.133 
Short-cycle tertiary educationc 0.202 0.210 0.259 0.316  0.176 0.276 
Upper secondary education (Baccalauréat) 0.213 0.224 0.179 0.179  0.361 0.299 
Secondary education (CAP/BEP)d 0.431 0.401 0.381 0.312  0.293 0.258 
Less than a CAP/BEP diploma 0.095 0.090 0.116 0.098  0.050 0.034 
Moved during studiese 0.113 0.131 0.109 0.140  0.176 0.214 
Individuals 11,577 21,059 17,308 31,893  3,401 7,159 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. a: Proportion among conscripts. b: Degrees awarded after more than 
two years of post-baccalauréat study. c: Degrees awarded after two years of post-baccalauréat study (DEUG, 
BTS, DUT). d: Vocational diplomas. e: Indicator for moving between the start of secondary education and the 







Table 1. OLS estimates of the effect of compulsory peacetime conscription on the 
propensity to migrate at the entry job stage. 
 Dependent variable: 1M  
 
Generation 1992 Generation 1998 
Generation 1992, 
1998, 2001. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Conscript  1S   .030*** (.009) .061*** (.010) .047*** (.007) 
Age   .006** (.003) 
Bachelor diploma .391*** (.031) .282*** (.023) .327*** (.017) 
Short-cycle tertiary education .175*** (.022) .104*** (.017) .143*** (.013) 
Upper secondary ed. (Baccalauréat) .082*** (.020) .010 (.016) .043*** (.011) 
Secondary education (CAP/BEP) .012 (.016) -.023* (.013) -.002 (.009) 
Less than a CAP/BEP diploma Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Moved during studies .078*** (.015) .026** (.012) .037*** (.009) 
Intercept -.179*** (.048) .019 (.027) -.238*** (.074)
Year-of-birth and commuting zone
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared .13 .12 .11 
Observations 11,440 17,145 31,986 
Notes: Samples containing men reaching the age of 16‒23 in the year in which they leave
education. In columns (1) and (2), age is perfectly collinear with year-of-birth dummies. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *: Significant at 10%. **: 






Table 2. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of compulsory peacetime conscription 
on the propensity to migrate at the entry job stage. 
 Dependent variable: 1M  




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male* Z  .015* (.008) .016 (.012) .018** (.008) .010 (.012) 
Year-of-birth, gender, and 
commuting zone dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Male*Birth year No Yes No Yes 
Observations 59,801 
Notes: Sample drawn from Generation 1992, 1998, and 2001, containing individuals reaching 
the age of 16‒23 in the year in which they leave education. 1Z   for individuals born before 
1979 and 0Z   otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *: 






Table 3. Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of compulsory peacetime conscription 
on the propensity to migrate at the entry job stage, by class location and rural/urban type of 
municipality. 
 Dependent variable: 1M  
 Lower class Upper class Rural Urban 
Excluding Male*Birth year (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male* Z  .004 (.010) .039** (.016) .015 (.020) .016* (.009) 
Including Male*Birth year (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Male* Z  -.003 (.016) .043** (.022) .033 (.031) .012 (.013) 
Personal determinants plus year-of-
birth, gender, and commuting zone 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 35,018 19,397 10,910 48,891 
Notes: Samples drawn from Generation 1992, 1998, and 2001, containing individuals reaching 
the age of 16‒23 in the year in which they leave education. 1Z   for individuals born before 
1979 and 0Z   otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *: 






Table 4. Reduced-form, first-stage, and IV estimates of the effect of compulsory peacetime conscription 
on the propensity to migrate at the entry job stage. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reduced form (dependent variable: 1M )     
Born before 1979  ix c  -.029** (.013) -.034** (.014) -.027** (.014) -.008 (.026) 
First stage (dependent variable: S )     
Born before 1979  ix c  .137*** (.011) .166*** (.009) .128*** (.011) .038 (.024) 
IV (dependent variable: 1M )     
Conscript  1S   -.209** (.099) -.202** (.084) -.213** (.107) -.208 (.703) 
Polynomial in  ix c  Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic 
 1 ix c *polynomial in  ix c  No No Yes Yes 
Personal determinants plus commuting
zone dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,145 
Notes: Sample drawn from Generation 1998 containing men born in 1975‒82. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses. Personal determinants do not include age.  1   is the usual indicator






Table 5. Bivariate probit estimates of the effect of compulsory peacetime conscription on the 
propensity to migrate at the entry job stage. Average marginal effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: S      
Born before 1979  ix c  .231*** (.008) .221*** (.013) .253*** (.008) .234*** (.007)
Dependent variable: 1M      
Conscript  1S   -.028 (.066) -.014 (.072) .042 (.094) .162* (.090) 
Polynomial in  ix c  Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic 
 1 ix c *polynomial in  ix c  No No Yes Yes 
Personal determinants plus
province dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
̂  .15 (.12) .13 (.13) .04 (.16) -.16 (.15) 
Observations 17,145 
Notes: Sample drawn from Generation 1998 containing men born in 1975‒82. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in parentheses. Personal determinants do not include age.  1   is the usual 






Table 6. Timing of service and propensity to migrate at the entry job stage. 
 Dependent variable: 2M  
 
Generation 1992 Generation 1998 
Generation 1992, 
1998, 2001. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Conscript  1S   -.052*** (.010) -.088*** (.012) -.062*** (.007) 
National service before 




Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,577 17,308 32,286 
Notes: OLS estimates. Samples containing men reaching the age of 16‒23 in the year 
in which they leave education. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 






Table 7. Timing of service and propensity to migrate at the entry job stage, by class location and 
rural/urban type of municipality. 
 Dependent variable: 2M  
 Lower class Upper class Rural Urban 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Conscript  1S   -.058*** (.010) -.069*** (.013) -.029 (.018) -.071*** (.008)
National service before working 
 1T   .113*** (.011) .144*** (.015) .079*** (.021) .134*** (.009)
Personal determinants plus year-of-
birth and commuting zone 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,933 10,555 6,249 26,037 
Notes: OLS estimates. Samples drawn from Generation 1992, 1998, and 2001, containing men reaching 
the age of 16‒23 in the year in which they leave education. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 








Figure 1. Proportion migrating at the entry job stage and difference in migration 
proportions between men and women, by birth year. 
Notes: Sample drawn from Generation 1992, 1998, and 2001, containing individuals 
reaching the age of 16‒23 in the year in which they leave education. Circles represent 
the ratio of migrants as measured by 1M  to entry job acceptances. Triangles represent 
differences between men and women in the proportion migrating. Error bars show 95% 







Figure 2. Proportion of men migrating at the entry job stage and proportion doing 
national service, by birth year. 
Notes: Sample drawn from Generation 1998 containing men born in 1975‒82. Solid 
circles represent the ratio of migrants as measured by 1M  to entry job acceptances net of 
a linear trend in birth year. Hollow circles represent the proportion of conscripts in the 
corresponding birth cohort. 
